Abstract: Many natural and artificial entities can be predicted and explained both mechanistically, in term of parts and proximate causal processes, as well as functionally, in terms of functions and goals. Do these distinct "stances" or "modes of construal" support fundamentally different kinds of understanding? Based on recent work in epistemology and philosophy of science, as well as empirical evidence from cognitive and developmental psychology, we argue for what we call the "weak differentiation thesis": the claim that mechanistic and functional understanding are distinct in that they involve importantly different objects. We also consider more tentative arguments for the "strong differentiation thesis": the claim that mechanistic and functional understanding involve different epistemic relationships between mind and world. Understanding project. We are also grateful to Stephen Grimm for relevant discussions and helpful comments on an earlier draft.
eschew a representationalist framework on other grounds (e.g., Price 2011). Even on Hills' (2016) ability--centric account, part of understanding why is being able to put forward an explanation, which at least prima facie seems to require representing the understood as occupying a specific node in an explanatory nexus. Since our focus will be on how the representations that make up understanding are effected, we will concentrate mostly on the representational component-however, everything we say about generating such representations holds true whether they exhaust understanding or only complement some other property of the understander (e.g., an ability).
For example, someone who predicts what will happen when pressing a button on an alarm clock by considering the underlying electronic components and the physical laws that govern them is applying the physical stance; someone who does so by thinking about how the alarm clock would be designed and assuming that it is functioning properly is applying the design stance.
An idea akin to Dennett's stances was introduced into the psychological literature by Frank Keil, who argued that even young children are equipped with multiple "modes of construal" that "frame" explanations by positing certain kinds of relations, properties, or arguments as central (Keil 2006) . Like Dennett, Keil argued that these include a mechanical / physical mode of construal and a teleological / functional mode of construal. Keil argued for these modes of construal on the basis of children's patterns of explanations and predictions across domains (Keil 1994 (Keil , 1995 . In particular, he distinguished between what we will call "mechanistic" explanations (involving parts or proximate causal mechanisms) and "functional" explanations (involving functions, purpose, or goals), where the former reflects the operation of a mechanistic mode of construal, and the latter the operation of a functional mode of construal.
Importantly, modes of construal (or stances; we will use these terms interchangeably) are not themselves domain theories, such as (scientific or intuitive) physics, or (scientific or intuitive) psychology. Nonetheless, these domain theories may be prerequisites to the successful application of a mode of construal: it is these theories that supply the laws required to apply a physical stance, and that constrain inferences about what would constitute good design and proper functioning. Modes of construal, unlike domain theories themselves, provide a template or algorithm of sorts, determining the basis for a prediction or explanation, and accordingly constraining which domain theories will be consulted and how.
If modes of construal are strategies for interpreting entities and their behavior, they do not themselves constitute understanding. Nonetheless, we think there are two meaningful ways in which we might say that stances support or reflect understanding, corresponding to the output versus the input to the corresponding mode of construal. First, the representations that result from the application of a stance to a particular entity will include the representational bases for prediction and explanation -typically the identification of causal and explanatory relationships that hold (or are believed to hold) for the case in question. For example, applying the physical stance to an alarm clock will involve representing the components of the alarm clock as instantiating more general causal relationships encoded in an intuitive physical theory. Applying the design stance to a fawn's spots could involve drawing inferences about the function the spots might serve in a particular ecological context. In this way, the application of a stance will include the creation of representations that can constitute at least the representational component of understanding.
4 They can constitute understanding because they satisfy the common requirements for understanding that we identified in Section 1: representing the right kinds of dependence relations.
A second way in which modes of construal might relate to understanding is in the way they pick out aspects of intuitive theories. First, note that an intuitive theory could itself constitutes some form of understanding. On most accounts, intuitive theories are defined in terms of the explanatory generalizations and causal relationships that they represent (e.g., Carey 1985 , Gopnik, Maltzoff, & Bryant 1997 , Gopnik & Wellman 2012 Murphy & Medin 1985) , again providing a good match to the accounts of understanding that we identify in Section 1. On this view, the components of a theory that in a specific context are employed in applying a mechanistic mode of construal might be said to constitute "mechanistic" understanding (in that context), while those employed in applying a functional mode in a specific context might be said to constitute "functional" understanding (in that context).
To illustrate these two ways of relating modes of construal to understanding, consider again our spotted fawn. Someone who has an intuitive theory of biology that includes resources for explaining biological adaptations might possess some "functional understanding" of biological adaptations in general. When applying this to the spotted fawn, she comes to possess some functional understanding of why fawns have spots. It is this latter form of understandingthe understanding that results from the application of a mode of construal to a particular entitythat the empirical evidence has most closely addressed, and that we turn to in Section 3.
The empirical evidence for mechanistic and functional modes of construal
The majority of research on mechanistic and functional modes of construal has focused on mechanistic and functional explanations, with the (often implicit) assumption that the endorsement or generation of each explanation type reflects the operation of its corresponding mode of construal. Accordingly, our review will focus on what we know about these two kinds of explanations.
First, we begin with an important similarity: both mechanistic and functional explanations are understood as causal explanations. For mechanistic explanations this is an uncontroversial claim; they explicitly appeal to proximate causes and causal mechanisms.
However, this isn't self-evidently the case for functional explanations -after all, functional explanations explain current properties or events by appeal to potential future consequences, and thus seem to get the causal order wrong. When we explain that the teacher gave a pop quiz "to teach her students a lesson," we seem to be explaining a current action by appeal to an anticipated but unrealized effect of that action. When we explain the fawn's spots by appeal to camouflage, we seem to be explaining a current property by its potential future influence on predators.
Several accounts of functional explanation offer ways to understanding future-looking functional explanations in more standard backwards-looking causal terms (e.g., Allen 2009 , Wright 1976 some property P to be explained by appeal to some function F, participants had to endorse the claim that had P not resulted in F, the entity with P probably wouldn't have had P.
Additional work supports the idea that functional explanations are tied to particular causal commitments. Kelemen and DiYanni (2005) found that children were more likely to accept a functional explanation for the origins of an entity or event (e.g., "the first ever thunderstorm occurred to give the earth water so everything would grow") if they also believed that the entity or event was created by "someone or something." Adults are also more likely to accept scientifically-unwarranted teleological explanations (e.g., "water condenses to moisten the air") if they endorse some Gaia-like causal force ( If mechanistic and functional explanations are both causal explanations, we can already see why knowing or grasping them might constitute understanding on the sort of view sketched in Section 1. The next question, then, is how they differ from each other. One differentiating factor has already emerged: whereas mechanistic explanations invoke proximate causal processes directly, functional explanations do so indirectly; they don't wear their causal commitments on their sleeves. But the literature provides two additional bases for differentiation that are worth reviewing in turn: functional explanations are to some extent mechanismindependent, and they have a distinct developmental and cognitive profile.
First, consider the claim that functional explanations are mechanism-independent in the sense that they highlight dependence relations that can be multiply realized, and that their explanatory value is enhanced, rather than diminished, by the dissociation from particular mechanisms. The intuition behind these claims is nicely illustrated by William James's description of the relationship between Romeo and Juliet (an intentional system) versus iron filings and a magnet (a physical system):
"Romeo wants Juliet as the filings want the magnet. And if no obstacles intervene, he moves toward her by as straight a line as they. But Romeo and Juliet, if a wall be built between them, do not remain idiotically pressing their faces against its opposite sides, as in fact the iron filings do, pursuing the magnet. Romeo soon finds a circuitous way, by scaling the wall or otherwise, of touching Juliet's lips directly. With the filings the path is fixed; whether it reaches the end depends on accidents. With the lover it is the end which is fixed, the path may be modified indefinitely" (James 1890, p. 20).
Romeo, unlike the iron filings, will find an alternative way to reach Juliet. He'll climb the wall;
he'll dig a tunnel. The relationship that's stable is that between Romeo's goal of reaching Juliet and his eventual arrival at her side; the means by which he accomplishes this might be variable and highly contingent on idiosyncratic features of the way things happened to unfold. It's this sense in which reasoning about Romeo and Juliet in terms of functional relationships is mechanism (or means) independent. Correspondingly, we can explain Romeo's actions with a functional explanation ("he went that way to reach Juliet"), and this might strike us as more appropriate than a mechanistic explanation ("he went that way because he moved his muscles in such and such a way…") precisely because it identifies the dependence relation that's robust across irrelevant perturbations (see also Murray & Lombrozo 2017).
Consider an example from Daniel Dennett, motivating the design stance:
"Suppose I categorize a novel object as an alarm clock: I can quickly reason that if I depress a few buttons just so, then some hours later the alarm clock will make a loud noise. I don't need to work out the specific physical laws that explain this marvelous regularity; I simply assume that it has a particular design-the design we call an alarm clock-and that it will function properly, as designed." (Dennett 1991) In a case like this, the relationship between the buttons and the noises can be multiply realized;
it's the function or design of the clock that constrains their relationships. We don't need to reason on the basis of physical laws and causal mechanisms because the explanatory and predictive relationships that we care about are mechanism independent. "The essential feature of the design stance," Dennett writes, "is that we make predictions solely from knowledge or assumptions about the system's functional design, irrespective of the physical constitution or condition of the innards of the particular object" (Dennett 1971) . This is part of what makes the design stance so powerful: we can achieve some predictive and explanatory competence without detailed knowledge of general mechanisms or detailed knowledge of how particular causal processes unfolded in the past.
Psychological evidence supports the idea that while functional explanations are understood as causal explanations, they are (at least somewhat) mechanism independent. One source of evidence comes from studies that have examined people's patterns of generalization, where they could generalize on the basis of proximate mechanisms or on the basis of functions and design (Ahn, 1998; Lombrozo, 2009; Lombrozo & Gwynne, 2014 ; see also Lombrozo & Rehder, 2012) . When participants were given or generated functional explanations, they were significantly less likely to generalize on the basis of proximate mechanisms (relative to functions).
To illustrate, consider a study from Lombrozo and Gwynne (2014) . In this study, participants learned about animals and artifacts, where each had a target property that could be explained either mechanistically or functionally. For example, some participants read about a plant called a narp with a speckled pattern. They learned that "biologists have discovered that in narps, the speckled pattern is caused by the XP2 gene." This supported the mechanistic explanation that narps have a speckled pattern because of the gene. They also learned that "having a speckled pattern attracts butterflies, which play a role in pollination." This supported the functional explanation that narps have a speckled pattern to attract butterflies for pollination.
Participants were then asked to explain, in a sentence, why narps have a speckled pattern. This prompt was deliberately ambiguous: it could be answered by providing a mechanistic explanation, a functional explanation, or both.
After responding to the ambiguous prompt, participants learned about novel items that shared either the proximate cause (e.g., another plant with the XP2 gene) or the function (e.g., another plant that attracts butterflies for pollination), and they were asked whether they would generalize properties from the initial item (the narp) to these new cases. For example, if participants were told that the speckled pattern on narps is high in contrast, would they be inclined to think that the speckled pattern of the other plant with the XP2 gene, or the other plant that attracts butterflies, was also high in contrast? A key finding was that for biological organisms, those participants who provided a functional explanation in response to the ambiguous prompt were less likely than those who did not do so to generalize on the basis of underlying causal mechanisms. Instead, for all types of items, participants who provided a functional explanation were more likely than those who did not do so to generalize on the basis of shared functions.
A second source of evidence for the idea that some level of mechanism independence can be induced by a functional mode of construal comes from people's causal ascriptions. Lombrozo Specifically, while C "caused" the effect in the sense that the effect would not have occurred in its absence, C did not produce the effect through some spatiotemporally continuous mechanism or direct transmission of force.
The key experimental manipulation was whether participants were given additional information that would allow them to construe the relationship between C and the effect functionally. Half the participants were told that the effect (reflecting high frequencies of UV light) serves a biological function (temperature regulation), and that the shrimp evolved to eat A and C for this reason. The key finding was that participants were significantly more inclined to consider C a cause of the effect when this functional relationship held, such that the difference in ratings between A (the productive cause) and C (the dependence cause) was decreased. This suggests that when construing a relationship functionally, participants' judgments of whether some factor caused an effect were less sensitive to the nature of the mechanism mediating the counterfactual dependence between the effect and the candidate cause. Oppenheimer, and Zemla (2010) found that when participants adopted a more abstract mode of construal, which is itself associated with reasoning in terms of functions, they experienced a larger IOED. When reasoning functionally, it seems, they had less metacognitive access to their deficient mechanistic understanding.
A fourth source of evidence for a relationship between a functional mode of construal and mechanism independence comes from looking-time studies with infants. Woodward and her colleagues have shown that when infants construe an agent's action as a goal-directed reach, they are more likely to expect that the agent's next action will preserve the same goal, even if it involves a departure in means, such as reaching left versus right (e.g., Cannon & Woodward 2012 , Woodward 1998 . Research by Gergely and colleagues illustrates that infants can also use variation in means as a basis for inferring that an agent is rational in its pursuit of goals: when an agent's goal is preserved despite variation in means, 12-month-olds develop expectations that the agent will seek the goal, and will do so in the most rational (i.e., spatially efficient) way possible (e.g., Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro 1995).
To sum up, these studies on generalization, causal ascription, metacognition, and infants' perception of goal-directed action support the idea that adopting a functional construal differs from a mechanistic construal in that the former allows for a more mechanism-independent form of reasoning. More recent work by Liquin and Lombrozo (in prep) sheds further light on why this might be. They find that when evaluating a functional explanation, judgments are largely (though not exclusively) driven by an assessment of how well a proposed feature (such as "reflecting high frequencies of UV light") "fits" a given function (such as "thermal regulation").
This evaluation of structure-function fit may involve some mechanistic reasoning, but it crucially does not depend upon a detailed analysis of the feature's etiology. Indeed, Liquin and Lombrozo find that when an explanation contains functional information, participants become less sensitive to etiological detail.
A second factor that differentiates mechanistic and functional construals may or may not be related: there's evidence that functional explanations may be psychologically privileged in the sense that they are often favored and seem to be less cognitively demanding. In particular, there's evidence that children use them "promiscuously" (Kelemen 1999), and that adults will In sum, there is good evidence for the claim that mechanistic and functional explanations are psychologically distinct. They not only differ in their causal commitments, but also in the extent to which they demand and depend upon an articulation or specification of mechanisms or particular causal processes. They also differ in the dependence relations that they privilege for the purpose of generalization. Perhaps for these reasons, functional explanations seem to have a special role in development and may be less cognitively demanding.
On the view of understanding articulated in Section I, representations of mechanistic and functional explanations are good candidates for understanding: they encode causal and explanatory relationships that plausibly support an understanding for why some entity has a particular property or exhibited a particular behavior. But do they merely support understanding of different things? Or do they constitute different kinds of understanding? We turn to the weak and strong differentiation theses in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
The case for weak differentiation
In Section 1, we suggested that understanding involves some representation of dependence or explanatory relations. In Sections 2 and 3, we suggested that mechanistic and functional modes of construal support mechanistic and functional understanding, respectively. In this section, we consider whether this evidence supports the weak differentiation thesis, namely that mechanistic and functional understanding are different insofar as they involve different objects (whether or not they also involve different epistemic relations to those objects). We suggest that mechanistic and functional understanding indeed involve different content, support different functions, and have a distinctive phenomenology. However, we will also argue that each of these claims is insufficient to support the strong differentiation thesis that these constitute different kinds of understanding.
The claim that mechanistic and functional understanding involve different content follows straightforwardly from the data presented in Section 3. We've seen that they involve mechanistic versus functional explanations, privilege production versus dependence notions of causation, and privilege different dependence relations as a basis for inference. Yet there are good reasons to doubt that understanding should simply inherit criteria for individuation from explanation, causation, or some inferential role. If understanding is a relation between mind and world, it might be the same relation even when the world provides starkly different relata. As an analogy, knowledge of mechanisms and knowledge of functions take very different objects, but we would not for that reason usually be inclined to say that they manifest more than one knowledge relation. There might be some objects so diverse that we have reason to posit multiple knowledge relations, but mechanisms and functions can still be known in approximately the same way.
Mechanistic and functional understanding also differ with respect to their core functions.
While both support prediction and explanation, mechanistic understanding is particularly useful for prediction and explanation in some domains, while functional understanding is more useful in others. Moreover, as shown in Vasilyeva, Wilkenfeld, and Lombrozo (2017) , people privilege the explanations that support their current inferential goals. But once again, it's not clear that supporting different kinds of inferences underwrites the stronger claim that an understanding of whatever-supports-mechanistic-inferences and an understanding of whatever-supportsfunctional-inferences are different kinds of understanding. Knowledge of statistics supports inductive inferences, whereas knowledge of geometry supports deductive inferences, but we would not on that basis typically be inclined to consider them different kinds of knowledge.
Finally, consider the claim that mechanistic and functional understanding are distinct with regard to their phenomenology. This claim goes admittedly beyond the data, but it's only a modest step from the claim that functional explanations are a cognitive default of some kind (a claim that may or may not be right) to the claim that they are satisfying in a more basic or intuitive way. However, there is reason to doubt that when two tokens of understanding feel different to their respective understanders, we have good grounds for saying that they belong to two different kinds of understanding. Knowledge that one is in danger might feel quite different from knowledge that one is safe; it doesn't follow that the knowledge relation is different in kind.
If differences in content, function, and phenomenology are insufficient to support the claim that mechanistic and functional understanding are different kinds of understanding, it might be tempting to reject their uniqueness entirely, and to instead consider the possibility that mechanistic and functional understanding are but two among a very large number of possible targets for understanding. On this licentious view, any strategy for privileging a subset of the enormously complex (explanatory) dependence relations in the world offers a "mode of construal" and thus a possible target for understanding. Moreover, mechanistic and functional understanding have no special status with respect to these alternatives, and all of these alternatives support understanding in just the same way: by supporting representations of the dependence relations that constitute understanding.
We think this possibility misses something important. It's not a coincidence that mechanistic and functional stances or construals arise again and again in philosophy and in psychology, across disciplines and over time. These two construals -unlike an arbitrary subset of dependence relations -seem to capture something important about the structure of the world and our goals within it. Proximate causes and goals, under the right circumstances, identify dependence relations that are particularly stable, or insensitive to perturbations in background conditions (Lombrozo 2010 , see also Blanchard, Vasilyeva, & Lombrozo forthcoming, Woodward 2006 ). Given our goals, they might be particularly useful bases for prediction and intervention. For these reasons, it seems appropriate to recognize mechanistic and functional understanding as understanding of special kinds of targets, even if the understanding itself is not different in kind. 5 It's for this reason that we favor some form of differentiation between mechanistic and functional understanding, even if it's only a weak form.
In sum, we think there is good evidence for the weak differentiation thesis: mechanistic and functional understanding have objects that are both important and importantly different from each other. At the same time, we don't think that the evidence just reviewed supports the stronger claim that mechanistic and functional understanding involve qualitatively different kinds of understanding. In Section 5, we evaluate this stronger claim.
The case for strong differentiation
In this section, we consider two tentative arguments for the strong differentiation thesis:
the claim that mechanistic and functional understanding reflect different epistemic relationships to the world. The two arguments that we consider are that mechanistic and functional understanding differ in their normative entailments and that they differ in their modal implications. These arguments are tentative in part because they stem from intuitive considerations rather than fully developed theoretical arguments, and in part because they have empirical commitments that have yet to be tested. Nonetheless, we think these possibilities merit further study, and so we sketch them here.
First, mechanistic and functional understanding seem to differ with regard to normative considerations. When we learn that an alarm clock has the function of waking its owner, we're in a position to evaluate whether it has done so well. The second way in which mechanistic and functional understanding could differ is with respect to the specificity of their commitments regarding the causal structure of the world. As we argued in Section 3, functional understanding is -in an important sense -mechanism independent. When we obtain functional understanding, our causal commitments radically underdetermine the actual causal process by which some property or event came to be. We can functionally explain why the alarm clock beeped by appealing to its design -and be satisfied with our explanation -even if we remain forever ignorant of whether its inner parts function electronically or pneumatically. For functional explanations, a "how possibly" story goes a long way; it might be enough to know that some process with a consequence etiology (Wright 1976) was at work, without knowing more about what it was or how it manifested. The same can't be said for mechanistic understanding. We might be satisfied by a vague appeal to the alarm clock's internal electronic processes, but a mechanistic explanation seems to demand a "how actually"
story. If this is right, then mechanistic and functional understanding are qualitatively distinct in the sense that they are differentially demanding with respect to what the actual causal structure of the world must be like.
In sum, we've sketched two arguments for the strong differentiation thesis. We've suggested that mechanistic and functional understanding involve different epistemic relationships in that the latter has normative and perspectival elements that introduce a world-tomind fit. We've also argued that because functional understanding is mechanism-independent, it makes weaker demands on the causal structure of the world -possibility is enough for understanding. These claims go beyond the weak differentiation thesis because they posit that mechanistic and functional understanding differ not only in terms of their objects, but in the mind-world relation that they require.
Conclusion
Our aim in this paper has been to review empirical evidence for mechanistic and functional modes of construal, and to relate this evidence to accounts of understanding. First, we argued that these modes of construal support understanding because they play a role in generating the kinds of representations that (at least partially) constitute understanding. Next, we argued that mechanistic and functional understanding are distinct in two ways: they involve importantly different objects, and (more tentatively) they involve different epistemic relationships. These claims have implications for how to think about understanding in epistemology and philosophy of science. They also invite us to ask a host of empirical questions about the psychological capacities that underwrite these forms of understanding, and about their implications for our interactions with the world.
